Buffalo Law Review
Volume 59

Number 4

Article 5

8-1-2011

The Agency Defense: Can the Legislature Help?
Yuval Simchi-Levi
New York County District Attorney's Office

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons

Recommended Citation
Yuval Simchi-Levi, The Agency Defense: Can the Legislature Help?, 59 Buff. L. Rev. 1109 (2011).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol59/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

The Agency Defense: Can the Legislature
Help?
YUVAL SIMCHI-LEVI†
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals, in a quartet of
cases, explicitly recognized the agency defense as a defense
to the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled substance and
criminal possession of a controlled substance with intent to
sell.1 The Court of Appeals held in those cases that
defendants who acted “solely as an agent of the buyer” could
invoke the agency defense.2 In those four cases, the Court of
Appeals also attempted to provide lower courts with
guidance on how to apply the agency defense.3 The Court of
Appeals reasoned that the agency defense would prevent
individuals who were not “tycoons of the trade” from being
subjected to the “severe penalties” of New York‟s drug laws.4
This Article will demonstrate that the time has arrived
for the New York State Legislature to expressly define the
agency defense in the Penal Law. Courts in New York are
struggling to consistently apply the agency defense, and
there are logical inconsistencies in how New York courts
have interpreted the agency defense. Without the
† Yuval Simchi-Levi is a graduate of Brandeis University and Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. He is an Assistant District Attorney
in the New York County District Attorney‟s Office. The views expressed in this
article are his own. The author wishes to thank the following for their
thoughtful comments: Craig Ascher, Gary J. Galperin, and Vincent Rivellese.
Special thanks are due as well to Jessica Pepe for her feedback on earlier drafts
of this Article.
1. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Lam Lek Chong,
379 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196 (N.Y. 1978);
People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191 (N.Y. 1978).
2. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206. See also Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 211;
Sierra, 379 N.E.2d at 198-99; Argibay, 379 N.E.2d at 194.
3. See Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213-14; Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 207-08;
Sierra, 379 N.E.2d at 199-200; Argibay, 379 N.E.2d at 195.
4. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206.
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Legislature‟s intervention, the agency defense could be
taken to extreme lengths by courts in New York. After
allowing the courts to struggle by themselves for more than
thirty years to develop the agency defense, the Legislature
must get involved and provide the courts with long overdue
guidance.
I. HISTORY OF THE AGENCY DEFENSE
The Court of Appeals first recognized the agency
defense in 1963, in People v. Lindsey, when it adopted the
New York Appellate Division for Second Department‟s
opinion reversing the conviction of two defendants because
they were agents of the buyers.5 The Court of Appeals was
not the first court in the United States to recognize such a
defense for a person charged with selling drugs. In 1954, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in
United States v. Sawyer, first recognized the agency defense
as a valid defense that could be asserted by a defendant
charged with selling drugs.6 After Sawyer, federal courts
permitted defendants prosecuted for selling drugs to assert
the agency defense.7
However, in 1970, Congress prevented defendants
prosecuted in federal court for selling drugs from asserting
the agency defense by passing the Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act.8 In that statute, Congress defined the term
“deliver” as “the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer
of a controlled substance or a listed chemical, whether or
not there exists an agency relationship.”9 In addition, that
statute made a defendant who purchased drugs “on behalf
of another and handed the drugs to that person, without
receipt of any consideration for his or her efforts . . . guilty
5. People v. Lindsey, 189 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1963), aff’g 228 N.Y.S.2d 427
(App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1962).
6. 210 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1954); Scott W. Parker, Note, An Argument for
Preserving the Agency Defense as Applied to Prosecutions for Unlawful Sale,
Delivery, and Possession of Drugs, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2649, 2652-53 (1998).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Winfield, 341 F.2d 70, 71 (2d Cir. 1965); Adams
v. United States, 220 F.2d 297, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1955).
8. Parker, supra note 6, at 2661-62.
9. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (2006); see
also Parker, supra note 6, at 2662.
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of „delivery.‟”10 The result of this legislation was that federal
courts no longer permitted defendants accused of selling
drugs to assert the agency defense.11
In New York, when the Court of Appeals established the
agency defense, the court traced the history of the defense
to cases “at the turn of the century” in which the “statutory
scheme prohibited the sale or furnishing of liquor but did
not prohibit the purchase.”12 The Court of Appeals noted
that the statute that criminalized the sale of liquor had
been interpreted as not intending “to punish, as a seller, one
who had simply purchased a bottle at the buyer‟s request to
accommodate him.”13 However, instead of citing “turn of the
century” New York cases dealing with liquor sales as
precedent, the Court of Appeals cited a 1910 case from the
state of Ohio, State v. Lynch,14 and a New York case from
1961, People v. McCrory.15 McCrory was a liquor sale case,
but it actually relied on two cases that dealt with the
application of the agency defense in drug transactions.16
Those two cases, People v. Buster and People v. Branch,
borrowed the notion of agency defense directly from
Sawyer.17 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not trace the
agency defense from the deep annals of New York criminal
law. Rather, the Court of Appeals borrowed the defense
from Sawyer, a federal court decision from the 1950s that

10. Parker, supra note 6, at 2662 (construing 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1994)).
11. Id. at 2662-63 n.81; see, e.g., United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 11-12
(1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Pierce, 498 F.2d 712, 713 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v.
Redwood, 492 F.2d 216, 216 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d
1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 220-21 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Workopich, 479 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th Cir. 1973).
12. People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 205 (N.Y. 1978); see also
Abraham Abramovsky, The Agency Defense in New York Drug Prosecutions,
N.Y. L.J., Apr. 1, 1997, at 3.
13. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 205.
14. 90 N.E. 935 (Ohio 1910).
15. 222 N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
16. Id. at 114.
17. People v. Branch, N.Y.S.2d 535, 535 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1961); People v.
Buster, 135 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1955).
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recognized the agency defense as a defense in drug
transactions.18
II. WHAT IS THE AGENCY DEFENSE?
In New York, the agency defense is a claim by a
defendant, charged with selling drugs or possessing drugs
with intent to sell, that he acted “solely on behalf of the
buyer,”19 and thus was a mere extension of the buyer in the
drug sale.20 The rationale behind the agency defense is that
an agent of the buyer cannot be convicted for the crime of
selling drugs.21 After all, the buyer‟s agent is “merely
transferring to the recipient that which the recipient
already owns or that to which he is entitled, there being no
sale, exchange, gift or disposal of the drugs to the
recipient.”22
The agency defense can be invoked only by defendants
charged with the crimes of criminal sale of a controlled
substance and criminal possession of a controlled substance
with intent to sell.23 The defense cannot be invoked by those
charged with drug possession.24 Furthermore, the agency
defense is not an affirmative defense that the defense must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence.25 Rather, the
agency defense must be disproven beyond a reasonable

18. The only New York case cited in both Branch and Buster, People v.
Pasquarello, 123 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 1953), aff’d, 306 N.Y. 759
(1954), held that a buyer is not considered to be an accomplice of a seller under
New York law. Id. at 100.
19. Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 3.
20. People v. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 196, 198-99 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Argibay,
379 N.E.2d 191, 195 (N.Y. 1978).
21. Branch, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 535.
22. Sierra, 379 N.E.2d at 199 (citation omitted).
23. See People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208 (N.Y. 1978); People v. Lam Lek
Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200 (N.Y. 1978); Sierra, 379 N.E.2d 197; Argibay, 379 N.E.2d
191.
24. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206 (“The fact that the defendant was
acting as a buyer is no defense to a possession charge when the Legislature has
made buyers liable for the offense.” (citation omitted)).
25. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213; see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 25.00(2) (McKinney
2009).
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doubt by the prosecutor since it negates the sale element of
the crime.26
The determination of whether a defendant is actually
an agent is a “factual question for the jury to resolve on the
circumstances of the particular case.”27 New York courts
have provided a variety of factors to assist the jury in
evaluating whether the defendant is an agent. For instance,
the agent cannot assist the buyer “out of any independent
desire or inclination to promote the transaction.”28 “[T]he
agent must have no direct interest in the contraband being
sold.”29 “If [the seller] is in fact interested in the outcome,
either by ownership of the property or by an agency
relationship with the seller, he fails, by definition, to be an
agent for the purchaser.”30 The jury is also encouraged to
look at “the nature and extent of the relationship between
the defendant and the buyer, whether it was the buyer or
the defendant who suggested the purchase, whether the
defendant has had other drug dealings with this or other
buyers or sellers, and . . . whether the defendant profited or
stood to profit from the transaction,”31 as well as whether
the defendant touted the quality of the product or bargained
over price.32 Ultimately, agency defense hinges on whether,
given the evidence presented at trial, “the defendant can be
said to have acted solely on behalf of the buyer such as to be
a mere extension or instrumentality of the buyer.”33
The Court of Appeals distinguished an agent from a
middleman—a person “who acts as a broker between a
seller and buyer, aiming to satisfy both, but largely for his
own benefit . . . .”34 The middleman cannot invoke an agency
defense because a middleman “is a trader in narcotics, a
merchant. He may not be concerned with the particular
26. See Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 213.
27. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206 (citation omitted).
28. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d at 195.
29. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212.
30. Id. (citation omitted).
31. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 207.
32. Roche, 379 N.E.2d at 212.
33. People v. Ortiz, 560 N.E.2d 162, 164 (N.Y. 1990).
34. People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191, 194 (N.Y. 1978).
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needs of an individual drug purchaser except to the extent
that satisfying those needs affects his illicit business.”35
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE AGENCY DEFENSE
The problems with the agency defense stem from the
fact that it is inconsistent with the actual definition of a
drug sale in New York. Also, when the agency defense was
recognized in New York, there does not seem to have been
any consideration as to how it would coalesce with other
elements that the prosecution had to prove in a drug sale
case. Thus, the defense has become muddled and has not
developed along with the legal jurisprudence regarding drug
sales.
In 1967, New York‟s drug laws were changed.
Previously, the definition of a drug sale was limited to those
“who shall peddle, sell, barter, or exchange [drugs].”36 Then
in 1967, the Legislature defined the term “sell” as “to sell,
exchange, give or dispose of to another, or to offer or agree
to do the same.”37 A literal reading of the statute would
mean that “any passing of drugs from one person to another
would constitute a sale” under the statute.38 The Legislature
expanded the definition of drug sale because it determined
that a drug seller who provides a drug addict with drugs
“free of charge” is as criminally liable as one who gives the
drug addict the drugs for a certain amount of money.39 What
bothered the Court of Appeals was that there were other
cases that fell within the statutory definition of a drug sale
in which it felt that a “seller” was not as liable as other drug
sellers for selling drugs.40 For example, if a person gave
money to a friend to acquire drugs and the friend did so, the
friend would be as liable under the definition of the term
“sell” as a drug seller even though he is “simply a buyer who
purchased the drugs on behalf of another.”41 The agency
35. Id.
36. Tonis v. Bd. of Regents, 67 N.E.2d 245, 247 (N.Y. 1946).
37. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(1) (McKinney 2008); see also Lam Lek Chong,
379 N.E.2d at 205-06.
38. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 205.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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defense was created to prevent that friend from being
convicted of selling drugs.
The Court of Appeals held, in People v. Lam Lek Chong,
that the agency defense applied under the new definition of
a drug sale because there was “no indication that the
Legislature intended to abandon the judicial construction
[of the agency defense] which had been previously accepted
throughout the State.”42 The Court of Appeals also pointed
out that the agency defense was a way to give appropriate
culpability to a person “under a statutory scheme which
reserves the most severe penalties for the „tycoons of the
trade.‟”43
The problem with the Court of Appeals‟ statutory
analysis of the drug-selling statute is that the Legislature
defined the term “sell” in such a way that eliminated the
agency defense. The agency defense existed in New York
before 1967.44 However, by including the terms “exchange,
give or dispose of to another” in the definition of drug sale
after 1967,45 the Legislature appeared to have meant to
eliminate the agency defense, or at least to broaden the
scope of New York‟s drug laws. Indeed, one of the judges
who dissented in the quartet of cases that established the
agency defense opposed the defense because he did not
believe that the Legislature intended for its continued
existence.46 The definition of the term “sell” appears to have
eliminated the agency defense given that it explicitly
includes “any form of transfer of a controlled substance from
one person to another.”47
IV. THE LOWER COURTS‟ STRUGGLE TO APPLY THE AGENCY
DEFENSE
The New York Court of Appeals wanted to create an
open-ended list of factors to determine whether a defendant
42. Id. at 206.
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. See, e.g., People v. Lindsey, 228 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t
1962), aff’d, 189 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1963).
45. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 220.00(1) (McKinney 2008).
46. People v. Roche, 379 N.E.2d 208, 214-16 (N.Y. 1978) (Gabrielli, J.,
dissenting).
47. People v. Starling, 650 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted).

1116

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59

was an agent of the buyer.48 The Court of Appeals
recognized that there were many permutations of ways in
which a drug transaction could actually occur. 49 However,
one would expect courts to apply the agency defense in such
a manner that similar facts result in similar outcomes. That
has proven to be difficult in the case of the agency defense,
since even the Court of Appeals has admitted that there are
certain factors that might support or negate the agency
defense depending on the circumstance. For example, the
Court of Appeals has said that “receipt of any benefit,
particularly a substantial reward promised in advance may
be sufficient, as a matter of fact, to show that the defendant
did not act solely to accommodate the buyer.”50 But, “receipt
of some incidental benefit, does not necessarily or even
ordinarily alter the relationship” between the defendant
and the buyer.51
Lower courts have had difficulty interpreting what the
Court of Appeals meant when it said that a person could be
deemed an agent only when that person acted “solely as an
agent of the buyer”52 and that the agent cannot assist the
buyer “out of any independent desire or inclination to
promote the transaction.”53 For example, a defendant‟s
testimony that he helped an undercover officer obtain drugs
because he was hoping to share drugs with that officer has
resulted in two completely different outcomes.54 The Fourth
Department has stated, in People v. Coleman, that because
the defendant helped the undercover officer get drugs out of
a desire to smoke cocaine with the undercover officer, there
was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant
was an agent of the undercover officer.55 The First
Department has held to the contrary, in People v. Lopez,
that the fact that the defendant was hoping to obtain some
of the drugs given to the undercover officer for the
48. See Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d at 206-07.
49. See id. at 205.
50. Id. at 207.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 206.
53. People v. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d 191, 195 (N.Y. 1978).
54. Compare People v. Coleman, 728 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div. 4th Dep‟t 2001),
with People v. Lopez, 795 N.Y.S.2d 6 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2005).
55. Coleman, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
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defendant‟s personal use gave the defendant an interest in
the transaction and actually negated an agency defense.56
Whether a person is an agent primarily hinges on
whether that person acted “solely” for the buyers in
purchasing drugs. However, courts agree that a defendant‟s
desire to help an undercover officer purchase drugs out of a
desire to have sex with the undercover officer supports the
notion that the defendant was an agent of the undercover
officer.57 This is so, despite the fact that a defendant‟s
testimony that he helped a female undercover officer obtain
drugs in exchange for sex is quite clearly an “independent
desire or inclination to promote the transaction.”58 Thus, it
seems to be a mistaken application of the agency defense for
courts to apply it to a defendant who claims to have
acquired drugs for an undercover officer out of a desire to
have sex with that officer.59
56. Lopez, 795 N.Y.S.2d at 7 (denying the agency defense to a defendant who
purchased crack for an undercover officer because she was “desperate” to get
“high” and had acted as a go-between in drug transactions in exchange for drugs
in the past); see People v. Rojas, 642 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1996)
(holding the agency defense negated, inter alia, by the defendant‟s testimony
that she asked for a “little” of the drugs the undercover officer received from the
seller).
57. People v. Mason, 764 N.Y.S.2d 80, 81 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2003) (“[T]he
passes [defendant] made at the undercover officer do not establish that his
motivation for assisting her in obtaining drugs was his desire to have sex with
her.”); People v. Cromer, 753 N.Y.S.2d 716, 716 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2003)
(rejecting the agency defense where there was no reason to conclude that the
defendant‟s interaction with the undercover officer was “a romantic encounter”);
People v. Tucker, 733 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2001) (holding that
the agency defense was demonstrated, inter alia, by the defendant‟s testimony
that he assisted the undercover officer in obtaining drugs out of a hope to
“parlay” his interaction with the undercover officer into a sexual encounter);
People v. Metuxrakis, 678 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1998) (finding
the agency defense supported where the defendant testified that she was not a
drug seller, but was a prostitute and obtained drugs for the undercover officer in
order to exchange sex for money or drugs); People v. Ortiz, 558 N.Y.S.2d 22, 23
(App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1990) (“[D]efendant was entitled to the [agency defense]
jury instruction based upon his testimony that he did not know the seller, and
that he was acting solely on behalf of the buyer, a „pretty woman,‟ who
ultimately proved to be an undercover police officer.”).
58. Argibay, 379 N.E.2d at 195.
59. Professor Chiu points out that courts have difficulty applying the agency
defense in cases “where steerers receive some kind of tip from the ultimate
buyer” and in analyzing whether a defendant engages in “salesman-like
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The only explanation for why courts have carved out
this sex exception is that they have determined that the
desire to help one obtain drugs in exchange for sex is
analogous to a person doing a “favor” for a friend. The Court
of Appeals has not resolved this issue and even passed on
the question of whether the desire to help an undercover
officer in hope of sex supports the notion of an agency
defense.60 The problem with this “sex exception” is that it
has created a harbinger for defendants to testify,
particularly where an undercover officer is a female, that
the defendant helped the undercover obtain drugs out of a
desire to have sex with the undercover officer.
People v. Spradley underscores the confusion
surrounding the agency defense, especially when courts
attempt to adhere to the “sex” exception.61 In Spradley, the
defendant testified that she purchased crack cocaine from a
drug dealer on behalf of an undercover officer.62 The
defendant then delivered those drugs to the undercover
officer in exchange for sex.63 The Second Department
reasoned that “the agency defense is still available if the
defendant acts for himself or herself and for the buyer in
making the purchase.”64 That statement, however, directly
contradicts the principle that an agent is a person who acts
“solely as an agent of the buyer.”65
Another problem is that similar facts have resulted in
different outcomes under the agency defense doctrine. In
two cases, defendants accompanied undercover police
officers to locations where drugs were sold.66 The undercover
behavior” rather than that of an agent. Elaine M. Chiu, The Challenge of Motive
in the Criminal Law, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 653, 713-14 (2005).
60. People v. Job, 664 N.E.2d 500, 500 (N.Y. 1996) (affirming trial court‟s jury
instruction that an agency defense arises if the jury found that the agent acted
solely on the buyer‟s behalf where the defendant testified that the undercover
officer offered to “get her high” if she bought him crack, and that she kept two of
four vials purchased expecting to exchange sex for them).
61. 670 N.Y.S.2d 882 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1998).
62. Id. at 883.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 884.
65. People v. Lam Lek Chong, 379 N.E.2d 200, 206 (N.Y. 1978).
66. Compare People v. Santiago, 614 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1994),
with People v. Matos, 506 N.Y.S.2d 225 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1986).
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officers in both cases handed money to the defendants, who
then gave the money to the individuals who held the drug
stash.67 In People v. Matos, the Second Department held
that under those facts the defendant was the undercover
officer‟s agent.68 In People v. Santiago, the First Department
held that there was no reasonable view of the evidence that
the defendant was an agent of the undercover officer.69
Another example of a similar fact pattern resulting in
two different outcomes is illustrated by People v.
Cierzniewski70 and People v. Abdul-Aziz.71 In both cases, the
defendants led undercover officers to drug dealers.72 In
Cierzniewski, the defendant told the undercover detective
that the drug dealers could give the detective whatever drug
he wanted and told him that the price of the drugs that the
undercover detective requested was thirty dollars.73 The
undercover detective gave the money to the defendant, who
counted the money and then gave it to one of the drug
dealers.74 The defendant and the undercover detective then
walked back to where they had met.75 In contrast, in AbdulAziz, the defendant led an undercover officer to drug dealers
that were selling cocaine from an apartment.76 The
transaction was conducted by the drug dealers, not the
defendant, and the defendant never negotiated or handled
any of the cash or drugs.77 The defendant remained behind
for a little while after the undercover officer left, but he did
67. Santiago, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 400; Matos, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 226.
68. Matos, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 226. Notably, the First Department criticized
Matos by commenting that it was “not entirely persuaded” that the facts of
Matos made out an “agency defense as a matter of law.” People v. Fowler, 546
N.Y.S.2d 97, 99 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1989).
69. Santiago, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
70. 529 N.Y.S.2d 886 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1988).
71. 628 N.Y.S.2d 272 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1995). See also Abramovsky, supra
note 12, at 3, 6 (comparing the different results reached by the Appellate
Division in Cierzniewski and Abdul-Aziz).
72. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 273; Cierzniewski, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
73. Cierzniewski, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
77. Id.
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not “linger long in the apartment.”78 It is clear that the
defendant in Abdul-Aziz was less involved in the drug
transaction than the defendant in Cierzniewski because
Abdul-Aziz only introduced the officer to drug dealers,
whereas Cierzniewski set the price and handed the money
to the drug dealers.
Surprisingly, in Cierzniewski, the Second Department
found that a reasonable view of the evidence could support
an agency defense.79 In contrast, in Abdul-Aziz, the First
Department found that there was no evidence that would
support instructing the jury about the agency defense. 80 The
First Department commented that “[t]o the extent that the
Second Department‟s ruling in [Cierzniewski] reaches a
different result on analogous facts, we decline to follow it.”81
Although Cierzniewski appears to be wrongly decided, it has
been followed by the Second Department.82 The failure of
the Court of Appeals to provide clear standards has thus
resulted in erratic results.83
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE DEFINITION OF “DRUG SALE”
Another problem is that since 1978, the Court of
Appeals has undermined the agency defense by conceding
over the years that New York‟s drug sale laws are not
directed only at the “tycoons” of the drug trade. The Court of
Appeals‟ position on New York‟s drug sale definition has
evolved to the point that the court now believes that the
Legislature intentionally defined the term “sell” broadly.84
78. Id.
79. Cierzniewski, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
80. Abdul-Aziz, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 274.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., People v. Gun, 580 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1992);
People v. Jenkins, 550 N.Y.S.2d 736, 737 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1990); People v.
Kirk, 532 N.Y.S.2d 925, 926 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 1988).
83. See Chiu, supra note 59, at 715, 727-28 (arguing that inconsistent results
emerge in agency defense cases because courts and jurors are encouraged to use
“common sense” in applying the defense and because there is an “inherent
falsity” in the principal-agent relationship); Abramovsky, supra note 12, at 6
(contending that the Court of Appeals must set “firm guidelines” in order to
bring consistency to court rulings on the agency defense).
84. See People v. Starling, 650 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 1995).
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Indeed, the Court of Appeals has stated that a drug
transaction “unaccompanied by compensation or any verbal
representations indicating an offer or intent to sell does not
remove the act . . . from the scope of the prohibited conduct
and does not render it less culpable than a transfer
involving an immediate economic benefit to the seller.”85
Courts in New York now recognize that the definition of the
term “sell” does not necessarily involve “any consideration
for the transfer of drugs to the buyer.”86 For example, in
People v. Hughes, the Second Department concluded that a
drug sale occurred when an officer saw the defendant, who
was in the front passenger seat of a car, pass a “shiny
plastic object”—which turned out to contain fifteen bags of
crack cocaine—to another passenger in the back seat.87
Therefore, the underlying basis for why the agency defense
was created in New York—to prevent those individuals who
were not “tycoons of the drug trade” from being convicted of
selling drugs—has been undermined. It makes no sense
that the friend who helps out another by going to his drug
dealer to get drugs is any different from the defendant who
passes drugs to the person sitting next to him inside a car.
Another inconsistency with the defense is that juries
are instructed on the agency defense despite the fact that a
defendant is charged with selling drugs under an acting-inconcert theory.88 There is no situation in which a defendant
found to be acting-in-concert with a drug dealer could at the
same time be found not guilty of a drug sale. In that
85. Id.
86. People v. Herring, 632 N.E.2d 1272, 1273 (N.Y. 1994).
87. 886 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t 2009); see also People v.
Clinton, 802 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 2005) (finding drug sale
proven where evidence showed that “defendant provided a quantity of crack
cocaine” to another); People v. Casper, 731 N.Y.S.2d 652, 652 (App. Div. 2d Dep‟t
2001) (“The evidence was legally sufficient to establish that the defendant‟s
actions constituted the sale of a controlled substance. The defendant, knowing
that undercover officers were looking to purchase drugs from him, showed the
crack cocaine to the officers, and gave it to them.”); People v. Leonidow, 683
N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t 1998) (finding sale of marijuana where
the defendant “gave or exchanged” a joint with another).
88. See, e.g., People v. Andujar, 910 N.Y.S.2d 909, 909 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t
2010); People v. Carter, 899 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2010); People
v. Joshua, 896 N.Y.S.2d 46, 46 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2010); People v. Brown, 684
N.Y.S.2d 780, 780 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1999); People v. Montalvo, 681 N.Y.S.2d
238, 238 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 1998).
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scenario, the defendant would always be found guilty since
by definition, as an accomplice to another, the defendant did
not act “solely” as an agent for the buyer. Indeed, the Court
of Appeals made this exact point in People v. Herring when
it said that by finding the defendant guilty under an actingin-concert theory of engaging in a drug sale, the jury
“necessarily precluded the possibility of agency.”89
The table below illustrates how it is superfluous to issue
the agency defense in a case where the prosecutor‟s theory
is that the defendant is guilty of selling drugs as an
accomplice:
Accomplice Liability
Agency Defense
Result
90

The prosecutor proved
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was an
accomplice.

The prosecutor proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not an agent.

Guilty

The prosecutor did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was an
accomplice.

The prosecutor did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not an
agent.

Not guilty

The prosecutor proved
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was an
accomplice.

The prosecutor did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was not an
agent.

Not possible

The prosecutor did not prove
beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant was an
accomplice.

The prosecutor proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not an agent.

Not guilty

By instructing the jury on the agency defense, when a
defendant is accused of selling drugs under an acting-inconcert theory, the courts are just confusing jurors by
making them consider an irrelevant issue.

89. 632 N.E.2d at 1274.
90. See People v. Thomas, 613 N.Y.S.2d 442, 442-43 (App. Div. 3d Dep‟t
1994).
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VI. THE AGENCY DEFENSE TAKEN TO THE EXTREME
An illustration of how courts struggle to comprehend
the agency defense occurred when the First Department
asked the Court of Appeals to consider whether there
should be an “exception” in agency defense cases when
courts instruct the jury on a lesser-included charge.91 The
“exception” that the First Department wanted the Court of
Appeals to consider was whether, whenever the agency
defense is charged to the jury, the court should also submit
a lesser-included simple possession charge.92 The First
Department stated that question was “a matter best left to
the Court of Appeals.”93 However, this exception would have
been an inexplicable extension of the agency defense, given
that, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, there are many
cases when a defendant invokes the agency defense, but
does not actually possess drugs.94 Also, it is shocking that
the First Department said that the Court of Appeals was
“best” able to answer that question.95 The Legislature, which
sets the laws and policies of the state, is clearly in the best
position to answer that question.
CONCLUSION
The agency defense was firmly placed into New York
law in 1978 in the quartet of cases that each recognized the
defense and explained to the lower courts how to apply it.
This Article highlights that lower courts struggle to apply
the agency defense in a consistent manner and disagree on
how to apply the defense. And, courts have evolved the way
that they interpret New York‟s drug sale statutes by
changing from a narrow interpretation of drug sale to a
literal reading of the statute. However, courts have failed to
incorporate their new interpretation of New York‟s drug
sale laws to the application of the agency defense.
Underscoring the necessity for the Legislature to
become involved in explicitly defining the agency defense is
91. People v. Davis, 863 N.Y.S.2d 212, 215 (App. Div. 1st Dep‟t 2008).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. People v. Davis, 923 N.E.2d 1095, 1097 (N.Y. 2009).
95. Davis, 863 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
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the fact that in People v. Davis the Court of Appeals
considered whether, as a principle, every time the agency
defense was submitted to the jury the court should also
submit a lesser-included drug possession charge to the
jury.96 Although it was rejected, this would have been a
ludicrous extension of the agency defense because there are
times when a defendant claims to be an agent of the buyer,
but never handles drugs.
The agency defense “survives and thrives” in New York
because it serves as a “convenient political compromise for
juries, judges, and legislators.”97 After all, the Legislature
does not have to accept responsibility for those defendants
who are acquitted because of the agency defense since it did
not create the defense that allowed the defendants out of
prison. The courts benefit because, as shown above
regarding defendants who testify that they helped an
undercover officer obtain drugs so that they could get some
of those drugs,98 the agency defense provides the courts with
flexibility in determining that defendant‟s culpability. And
juries benefit, because if they feel that the undercover
officer preyed upon a defendant to get drugs, they can
always acquit by invoking the agency defense.
Yet, it is still shocking that the New York Legislature
has never formally authorized the agency defense by
making it a statutory defense. After all, it has reduced
penalties for drug offenders through sentencing reforms and
has even allowed those sentenced under old drug laws for
selling drugs to be resentenced in accordance with new drug
laws.99 Thus, even though the Court of Appeals might at one
point have believed that the Legislature would not be
sympathetic toward drug dealers,100 the New York
96. Davis, 923 N.E.2d at 1095-96.
97. Chiu, supra note 59, at 660.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 53-57.
99. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.46 (McKinney 2005); see Drug Law Reform
Act of 2005, 2005 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1581 (McKinney); Drug Law Reform Act of
2004, 2004 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1462 (McKinney).
100. Parker, supra note 6, at 2658 (“These courts may have also considered it
highly improbable that state legislatures would take an initiative to officially
incorporate the agency defense into their drug statutes. Such an action would
probably be unpopular with voters, who would likely perceive it as being too
lenient on criminals. Indeed, as one commentator observed, „What legislator
wants to appear soft on crime by decreasing penalties for offenses involving
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Legislature has proven that it is willing to be sympathetic
toward those caught up in the drug trade; and yet, it has
not recognized the agency defense.
The agency defense needs to be expressly defined in
New York‟s Penal Law. Because they were not involved in
the development of the agency defense, lower courts have
looked toward the Court of Appeals for help. As is clear from
this Article, the Court of Appeals has not effectively
provided that guidance. Given the more than thirty years of
jurisprudence regarding the agency defense, the
development of judicial interpretation of the definition of
“drug sale,” and the evolution of legislative policies dealing
with the drug trade in New York, the Legislature is in a
position to provide courts with guidance by providing a clear
statutory definition of the agency defense.

violence or drugs?‟” (quoting Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws:
Undermining the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L.
REV. 61, 123 (1993))).

